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Abstract
A (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme enables an original signer to delegate
his/her signing power to n proxy signers such that any t or more proxy signers can
sign messages on behalf of the original signer, but t−1 or less of them cannot produce
a valid proxy signature. Based on the RSA cryptosystem, Hong proposed an efficient
(t, n) threshold proxy signature for mobile agents. Cai et al. found that the scheme
due to Hong is proxy-unprotected, meaning that the original signer can generate a
valid proxy signature by himself. However, it is unclear whether the scheme can be
used in reality after fixing the security problem discovered by Cai et al.. In this letter,
we provide a detailed analysis on Hong’s scheme and show that the scheme fails to
achieve the properties of secrecy, proxy protected, undeniability, identifiability and
even time constraint and thus adopted of this efficient construction in practice is
not recommended.
Key words: Cryptography, Digital signature, Proxy signature, RSA cryptosystem,
Security analysis
1 Introduction
The notion of proxy signature [1] was invented by Mambo et al., which enables
a proxy signer to sign messages on behalf of an original signer in case of say,
temporal absence, lack of computational power etc. After validating the cor-
rectness of a proxy signature following a given verification algorithm, a verifier
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can be convinced of the original signer’s agreement on the signed message. In
the last years, fruitful achievements [2–9] of proxy signatures have been seen,
including novel constructions, analysis, improvements and applications. Proxy
signatures have found extensive uses in numerous practical applications such
as in distributed computing, e-commerce, e-cash, and grid computing where
delegation of rights is quite common [2,3]. Mambo et al. [1] classified this kind
of cryptographic primitive into two categories, namely, proxy-unprotected and
proxy-protected. A proxy-protected scheme, where only the proxy signer is
able to generate valid proxy signatures, is more practical since it accommo-
dates some highly desirable properties such as fairness and signature owner-
ship. In the latest research, delegation with warrant is popular because of its
high security and flexible delegation policy for a proxy signature scheme.
Among all the variants of proxy signature schemes, threshold proxy signature
is one of the useful cryptographic primitives. In a (t, n) threshold proxy signa-
ture scheme, the original signer delegates and distributes the signing power to
n proxy signers such that collaborative effort of at least t proxies is required
to the creation of a valid proxy signature, while t − 1 or less of them cannot
complete a signing operation. Threshold proxy signature is a promising prim-
itive for it allows the original signer to control the delegation of his signing
capability. Not only does it allow the original signer to choose the group of
proxies, but also the selection of the threshold value. Thus, to some extent,
threshold proxy signatures are more flexible and practical than traditional
proxy signature schemes. Based on the tricks of secret sharing and threshold
cryptography, Zhang [10] and Kim [11] proposed threshold proxy signature
schemes for the first time independently. Subsequently, Sun et al. [12] extended
the construction due to Kim et al. and presented a non-repudiable threshold
proxy signature scheme with known signers. Unfortunately, Hsu et al. [13]
found the scheme in [12] suffers from the conspiracy attack, namely, any t or
more proxy signers can get the secret keys of other proxy signers. Hwang et
al. [14] proposed a new threshold proxy signature scheme with known signers
and claimed their construction can achieve all the desirable security proper-
ties of a proxy signature scheme. However, Wang et al. [15] identified several
security weaknesses in the scheme and concluded that the scheme is not se-
cure. Observing there are few secure (t, n) threshold proxy signature schemes
based on the RSA cryptosystem, Hong [16] proposed a novel and practical
(t, n) threshold proxy signature from RSA mechanism by applying the tradi-
tional RSA cryptosystem without using additional cryptographic techniques,
and suggested to apply the proposal to mobile agent systems. They claimed
that the scheme satisfies all the desirable security requirements. Unfortunately,
Cai et al. [17] demonstrated an concrete attack against Hong’s construction in
which a malicious original signer can forge a valid threshold proxy signature.
Our contributions: It is not an easy task to construct a secure threshold
proxy signature scheme from the well-studied RSA problem since sharing the
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private key of the RSA system [20] among multiple members is difficult and
the Euler phi function of the modulus cannot be leaked to any proxy signer.
Hong’s scheme [16] has many advantages over other schemes in the same style
such as it shares the proxy signing key using the simple Lagrange formula; the
proxy signature generation and combination are completely non-interactive;
the sizes of both the partial proxy signing key and partial proxy signature are
independent of the number of the proxy signers. It is interesting to find out
whether we can use Hong’s scheme in reality after fixing the security problem
identified by Cai et al. [17]. Unfortunately, in this letter, after giving a detailed
analysis of Hong’s scheme, we find that the construction fails to achieve all the
security properties of a secure proxy signature scheme, including secrecy, proxy
protected, undeniability, identifiability and even time constraint (prevention
of misuse).
Organization: Section 2 reviews Hong’s threshold proxy scheme. Section 3
describes our security analysis of the scheme. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Review of Hong’s scheme
The following notations are used in Hong’s scheme [16]. The original signer
is denoted by U0, the n proxy signers are denoted by U1, · · · , Un, and a com-
biner is denoted by C. H is a secure hash function; mw denotes a warrant,
which specifies the identities of the original signer and the proxy signers, the
parameters (t, n), the valid delegation period and the kind of messages being
delegated etc. QN denotes the subgroup of squares in Z
∗
N . The following five
phases are involved in the scheme.
Setup: The original signer U0 picks two large secure primes of equal length
p0, q0 and computes N0 = p0q0, where p0 = 2p
′
0 + 1, q0 = 2q
′
0 + 1 with p
′
0, q
′
0
themselves prime. Let M0 = p
′
0q
′
0, which is the order of the group QN0 . U0
computes her RSA exponents e0 and d0 such that e0d0 ≡ 1 (mod M0). The
private key of U0 is (d0,M0) and the public key is (e0, N0). Each proxy signer
Ui(i = 1, 2, · · · , n) chooses two random large secure primes of equal length
pi and qi, and computes Ni = piqi, φ(Ni) = (pi − 1)(qi − 1), ei and di where
eidi ≡ 1 (mod φ(Ni)). The private key and the public key of Ui are di and
(ei, Ni) respectively.
Proxy sharing: U0 firstly generates the threshold proxy signing key D ≡
d0 · H(mw) (mod M0), and shares the signing key among the proxy signer
group as follows.
(1) Set a0 = D and for 1 ≤ i < t, pick at random ai from {0, · · · ,M0 − 1},
and define a t− 1 degree polynomial
f(x) ≡ a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ at−1x
t−1 (mod M0).
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(2) Compute partial proxy signing key ki ≡ f(i) (mod M0) for each proxy
singer Ui.
(3) For the purpose of share validation, U0 picks a random element v ∈ QN0
and computes vi = v
ki for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. U0 makes (v, v1, · · · , vn) public
and sends ki to Ui in a secure manner.
Proxy signature generation: Assume t different proxy signers Ui(i = 1, · · · , t)
would like to generate a proxy signature of message m on behalf of U0
cooperatively. Let x = H(m,mw) and △ = n!. Each proxy signer com-
putes the partial proxy signature xi = x
2△·ki ∈ QN0 . Then, Ui computes
△σi = ⌊xi/Ni⌋, σi ≡ x
di
i (mod Ni). To guarantee soundness, Ui produces a
proof that the discrete log of x2i to the base x̂ = x
4△ equals to the discrete log
of vi to base v. Specifically, Ui chooses a random r ∈ {0, · · · , 2
|N0|+2L1 − 1},
where L1 is a secondary security parameter, and a secure hash function
H ′(·), then computes v′ = vr, x′ = x̂r, ci = H
′(v, x̂, vi, x
2
i , v
′, x′), zi = kic+ r.
The final partial proxy signature due to Ui is (i,△σi, σi, ci, zi).
proxy signature combining: The combiner C can be one of the proxy sign-
ers or a secretary who does not possess any secret parameter. Upon re-
ceiving the partial proxy signature (i,△σi, σi, ci, zi) from Ui, C computes
xi = △σi ×Ni + (σ
ei
i (mod Ni)) and then checks if
c = H ′(v, x̂, vi, x
2
i , v
zv−ci , x̂
zx−2ci ).
If the equation holds, the partial proxy signature is valid; Otherwise, invalid.
Assume t partial proxy signatures are valid and without losing gener-
ality, the corresponding proxy signers set is s = {1, · · · , t} ⊂ {1, · · · , n}.
The proxy signature w of the message m under the warrant mw is w =
x
2λS
0,1
1 · · ·x
2λS
0,t
t (mod N0), where λ
S
i,j = △
∏
j′∈Sj
(i−j′)
∏
j′∈Sj
(j−j′)
.
Since we0 ≡ x4△
2·H(mw) (mod N0) and gcd(4△
2, e0) = 1, it is easy to
find out the final proxy signature y such that ye0 ≡ xH(mw) (mod N0) by
using a standard algorithm y = waxb 1 , where a, b are integers such that
4△2 a+ e0b = 1.
Proxy signature verification: Receiving a (t, n) threshold proxy signature
y of the message m under the warrant mw, a verifier checks that if y
e0 ≡
xH(mw) (mod N0) holds, where x = H(m,mw).
3 Security analysis of the scheme
A comprehensive security analysis was provided in [16] and the scheme was
claimed to achieve all the desirable security requirements. Unfortunately, in
this section, we present several security weaknesses in the scheme and thus
show that the claim is not valid.
1 This is a typo in [16], and the correct one is y = waxbH(mw)
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3.1 Secrecy
This property says that even if all the proxy signers collude, they cannot derive
the original signer’s private key. In [16], it was claimed that both signing and
verification algorithms are based on the RSA problem, one cannot derive the
proxy signing key D = d0 · H(mw) (mod M0). Moreover, even if t out of n
proxy signers conspire to obtain the group proxy signature key D, they cannot
derive the original signer’s private key d0. Below we demonstrate that the claim
does not hold.
Firstly, for any set Ω ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} satisfying |Ω| ≥ t, we can get △ · D ≡
∑
j∈S λ
S
0,j · f(j) (mod M0) using the Lagrange formula. Thus, any t or more
colluding proxy signers are able to compute the proxy signing key D. Worse
still, since D ≡ d0 ·H(mw) (mod M0), we can get
e0 ·D ≡ e0 · d0 ·H(mw) ≡ H(mw) (mod M0),
which means that e0 · D − H(mw) is a nonzero multiple of M0, where M0 =
p′0q
′
0 = φ(N0). However, following the well-known conclusion due to Miller [18],
knowing such a multiple of φ(N0) is equivalent to factoring N0. Consequently,
the t colluding proxy signers, after obtaining the value D, is capable of factor-
izing N0 and thus computing the secret key of the original signer. Specifically,
with the factors of N0, the colluding proxy signers can compute the Euler’s phi
function φ(N0), and they can get the private key d0 from e0d0 ≡ 1 (mod M0)
by employing extended Euclidean algorithm [19]. Therefore, the property of
secrecy is violated in the scheme.
3.2 Proxy protected and identifiability
Proxy protection states that only at least t out of n proxy signers can cooperate
to generate valid proxy signatures. Any third party, including the original
signer, cannot masquerade as proxy signers group to generate a valid proxy
signature. As identified by Cai et al. [17], since the final proxy signature is
y and the verification equation is ye0 ≡ H(m,mw)
H(mw) (mod N0), nobody
can recognize the identities of the t actual proxy signers upon receiving the
final proxy signature. That is to say, the property of identifiability cannot be
achieved in the scheme [16]. Moreover, they showed that an malicious original
signer can forge a valid proxy signature in polynomial time. Thus, the scheme
fails to provide the property of proxy protection.
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3.3 Unforgeability
According to the analysis above, we can conclude that the scheme is not
secure against the attacks due to the malicious original signer and malicious
proxy signers, namely, it is insecure against the insider attacks. Here we also
demonstrate that it is even possible for an outsider adversary to mount an
universal forgery.
(1) Choose an arbitrary warrant m∗w which records the delegation policy in-
cluding limits of authority, valid periods of delegation and proxy signa-
ture, the threshold value t and the identities and the public keys of the
original signer and the proxy signers group.
(2) Compute H(m∗w) and checks if e0|H(m
∗
w) holds. If it does not hold, re-
peats (1) and (2).
(3) Choose a message m∗ that conforms to the the warrant m∗w, and compute
y∗ ≡ H(m∗, m∗w)
k (mod N0) where H(m
∗
w) = ke0.
(4) Publish y∗ as the threshold proxy signature of message m∗ under the
warrant m∗w.
It’s easy to check the correctness of the forged proxy signature. Next we as-
sess the success probability of the adversary. The RSA parameters should be
thoroughly evaluated for security and efficiency [21, 22] in some applications.
To reduce the time of signature verification or encryption in RSA, one may
wish to use a small e. The smallest value for e is 3, but the value e = 216 + 1
is recommended to resist certain attacks [23]. Assume the recommended RSA
exponent e = 216+1 and the standard SHA1 hash algorithm, whose output is
of 160-bit, are employed. For a random m∗w, the probability that e0|H(m
∗
w) is
at least 2−16, which is not negligible. Thus, the expected time for the attacker
to find a warrant m∗w such that e0|H(m
∗
w) is within evaluating 2
16 hash values
on different warrants m∗w. This is highly feasible since modern computer can
handle hashing of a file over a 100 MB in less than 1 second 2 and the warrant
m∗w is supposed to be much shorter.
3.4 Undeniability
From the analysis of unforgeability, we can conclude that the scheme can
resist neither insider attacks nor outsider attacks. As a consequence, given a
threshold proxy signature, both the original signer or the proxy signer group
can deny having signed the message.
2 http://www.cryptopp.com/benchmarks.html.
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3.5 Time constraint
According to the universal forgery attack described above, an outsider ad-
versary can arbitrarily modify the warrant m∗w including changing the valid
periods of delegation, replacing the identities of the original signer and proxy
signers, modifying and scope of singing message, altering the threshold value
t, and then forge threshold proxy signature as long as e0|H(m
∗
w) holds. Thus,
the scheme fails to achieve the property of prevention of misuse as well.
4 Conclusion
In this letter, we presented a detailed security analysis of the threshold proxy
signature proposed in [16], and showed that it fails to achieve the properties
of secrecy, proxy protected, undeniability, identifiability as well as prevention
of misuse. Thus, its adoption in practice is not recommenced. Hopefully the
analysis is helpful for the future constructions of threshold proxy signature
from RSA assumption.
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